This article examines the incremental and often haphazard process in which the EC, as a relative latecomer on the stage of European cultural policy, developed into the key organization by the end of the Cold War. This development is particularly puzzling if one considers that the CoE had been in charge of cultural matters in Western Europe since the 1950s. How, then, did the EC come to play a role in this policy domain in the first place, and why did it ultimately become more significant than the Council of Europe? In order to answer these questions, it is key to analyse the interrelationship between the two organizations, this article argues. It claims that the EC's rise to prominence resulted to a great extent from its multifaceted exchanges with the CoE, in which the EC selectively adopted many CoE practices. There were three main reasons why the EC dominated the field by the end of the Cold War: its substantial financial means, with which the CoE could not compete; its legally more binding regulations in contrast to CoE rules; and, finally, the fact that EC cultural policies were first part of the Common and later of the Single Market project, as a crucial context without equivalent in the CoE. These developments, particularly at the level of inter-organizational exchange, were strongly driven by a small group of transnational policy entrepreneurs, experts and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) who pushed for EC action in this field. Other actors, in contrast, stressed the CoE's pioneering role, but increasingly lost ground.
The Cold War always loomed in the background of these processes. Throughout the period under study, culture was presented as a seemingly apolitical instrument to bridge the East-West conflict and, ultimately, several Eastern European countries participated in some of these Western European projects. In this context, the CoE and the more politicized EC also tried to use cultural exchange to promote Western values.
It should be added that the boundaries of cultural policy -as of the term 'culture' -were notoriously porous and vague, intersecting with issues as diverse as citizenship, education, media and market integration. This article shows how both the CoE and the EC refrained from proposing a clear-cut definition of culture and a precise remit for cultural policy. Interpretations shifted according to political needs and contexts, oscillating among anthropological, civilizational and more economic connotations. Debates in both forums drew heavily on concepts proposed in other contexts; neither organization can claim to have been an innovator in this regard. Hence, this article does not start from a preconceived definition of cultural policy; its whole point is to show the gradual emergence of a sphere of action at the European level, eventually leading to a discernable policy domain.
Besides scrutinizing general tendencies of inter-organizational exchange, we focus on two concrete case studies chosen for their particular significance for the period under study. For the 1970s, we highlight the debates about cultural heritage and the European Architectural Heritage Year (EAHY) project, which the CoE continues to praise -in its specific English -as a 'stone mile' in its activities. 3 Initiated by the CoE, the EAHY became one of the first cases of EC policy import, strongly facilitated by transnational networks. The second case study, for the 1980s, deals with the development of a European audio-visual policy. Here again the CoE took the lead and worked as a laboratory for schemes later adapted by the EC. By the mid-1980s, the EC's cultural initiatives had gained momentum and the cooperation with the CoE became less and less fundamental and formative for EC action in the field. Having said this, some member-states continued to oppose an EC cultural policy, and preferred the CoE as an alternative arena for audio-visual issues. As a result, contrasting modes of interaction emerged between the two organizations, fluctuating among cooperation, emulation and competition, all contributing to explaining the creation of an EC audio-visual policy by the end of the decade. Together, these two case studies also reveal that this field of political action was highly fragmented during the Cold War's last two decades, so that different institutional constellations, geographies, and actor networks came to define inter-organizational relations and their effects.
The existing literature on European cultural policy has mainly focused on intra-rather than inter-organizational dynamics. Only a few works have assessed these processes on a solid archival basis. 4 Many studies are dominated by the narratives created by the institutions under study themselves, 5 which often stress harmonious and cooperative interaction and fail to reveal the multi-layered and complex forms of links and exchange. Others have shown the significance of non-governmental organizations in promoting Western culture in the Cold War context. 6 Our interpretation, in contrast, explores the inter-organizational relations as well as the links between transnational policy entrepreneurs, networks and INGOs on the one hand and international organizations on the other. It builds on fresh archival research in the Historical Archives of the European Union in Florence, the Historical Archives of the European Commission in Brussels, UNESCO's archive in Paris, various national and private archives in Germany, Great Britain and France, as well as several interviews and a vast variety of grey literature. The article is structured as follows: a first part shows how, from the 1950s until the late 1970s, the CoE emerged as the leading international organization for cultural cooperation in Europe. The second part is dedicated to the case of the EAHY and the EC's increasing involvement in the cultural field in the 1970s. The section on audio-visual policy in the 1980s examines the intensification of competition between the EC and the CoE, before the conclusion summarizes our main findings.
Emerging coexistence, 1950s to late 1960s
The Treaty of Rome did not equip the EC with any explicit competence in the realm of culture, and against this backdrop, its gradual creep into this policy field is remarkable. The Treaty treated cultural commodities and services as any other part of the economy and only allowed certain export restrictions for the 'protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value' . 7 Other initiatives, such as the Commission's university information policy and its promotion of European studies, included educational and cultural dimensions. 8 Two reasons explain why the early EC touched upon culture only marginally, and chiefly through the economic lens. For one, the member-states regarded culture as their own preserve. Given the strong role culture and cultural policies had played historically in the rise of national identities and nation-states, they were reluctant to transfer extended competences in this realm to the international level. 9 This was even more so due to the EC's supranational elements and the federalist tendencies associated with it. 10 For another, other organizations already dealt with such issues at the international tier -most notably UNESCO at the global level and the CoE in Western Europe. The latter's range of activities always challenged plans for extending the EC's functions in this field. While never being consistent about it, the member-states continuously aimed at reducing overlapping powers and duplication between international organizations. 11 While the CoE always had more members than the EC, it would be wrong to overemphasize the difference in geography, at least for the period under study in this article. During the second half of the 1960s, the CoE had 12 members more than the EEC -but four of them (the United Kingdom, Denmark, Norway and Ireland) applied to join the Communities, and most of the remaining states were small (Iceland, Malta, Cyprus, Switzerland, Austria, Sweden, Greece and Turkey). Hence, the idea of avoiding duplication was not without substance.
But what, then, did the CoE do in this field? Article 1 of its 1949 Statute declared that the CoE aimed to 'achieve a greater unity between its members' , and amongst the areas in which 'agreements and common action' should be pursued, culture was mentioned prominently. 12 Partly to compensate for the failure of sweeping federalist hopes, the CoE soon developed several initiatives for culture, broadly defined. Some of its early work focused on exchange between scholars and artists, with art exhibitions figuring prominently on its agenda. There was no grand design that held the various programmes together; instead, they developed by trial and error. 13 Having said this, the CoE soon became the most important Western European international organization dealing with cultural policy. Its 1954 European Cultural Convention, focusing on the preservation of cultural heritage, was key in this respect. It provided the first official declaration on culture by a European organization during the post-war era and put cultural heritage front and centre. The text built on a broad definition of culture, referring to its civilizational dimension while also viewing culture in its material expressions, ranging from artistic patrimony to on-going cultural production.
14 One year later, in 1955, the concept of 'European cultural policy' officially entered the CoE's vocabulary. 15 December 1961 saw the creation of the Council for Cultural Co-operation (CCC), into which actors in the Consultative Assembly (one of the CoE's two statutory organs, later renamed the Parliamentary Assembly) in particular invested great hopes. Danish Representative Ole Bjørn Kraft stressed in a 1962 report that the creation of the CCC 'has marked the beginning of a new era of cultural cooperation in Europe' , hoping it would become 'what UNESCO is for the United Nations; it's probably not too bold to use the word EURESCO from now on' . 16 Such high-flying hopes never materialized. While the CCC enjoyed enormous autonomy, EC Commission sources noted in 1962 that the 'CCC's budget was very limited' , and that for this reason, the CCC's chairman was seeking to encourage the Commission 'to cooperate actively (= financially)' . While the Communities did not accept this proposal, the financial dimension came to define the CCC/CoE-EC relationship from an early stage. 17 Moreover, information channels between the two organizations were wide open. Since the 1950s, the parliamentary assemblies of the CoE and the EC started to hold joint meetings -no comparable links existed with the other international organizations at the time. 18 On cultural issues specifically, EC actors regularly attended CCC meetings as observers. 19 Against this backdrop, the European Parliament (EP) regularly discussed the CCC's work, just as it followed UNESCO's activities. 20 From the early 1960s, the CoE and the EC cooperated on a small-scale, case-by-case basis in the cultural realm, for instance by co-organizing the Campagne d'Éducation Civique Européenne. 21 The CoE took the lead in these forms of inter-organizational cooperation and held a dominant position in European cultural matters.
Having said this, the CoE also voiced concerns. When, in 1961, the EC planned to strengthen cooperation between the universities of its member-states and discussed setting up a European university in Florence, the CoE's Consultative Assembly proposed integrating this effort into a CoE framework. It critiqued such EC initiatives and stressed the advantages of the 'greater Europe' represented by its 18 member-states. 22 In the course of the next few years, the tone became less worried -simply because the EC achieved little. The CoE remained the key European actor in the field. Less well-known initiatives came on top. During the same year, UNESCO hosted a pan-European conference on culture in Helsinki. 26 Thanks to these and similar projects, questions of cultural heritage loomed large in international debates from the second half of the 1960s.
The CoE leapt into action when, in 1970, its Consultative Assembly recommended holding a European year of cultural heritage. On this basis, the CoE's Committee of Ministers decided in January 1971 to declare 1975 European Architectural Heritage Year, organized around the slogan ' A Future for our Past' . Similar to UNESCO's work, the main intellectual and political drivers of this project were the fear that urbanization, industrial growth, and an obsession with things modern jeopardized the existing architectural heritage. 27 Institutionally, this initiative was partly triggered by UNESCO's work and the need to underscore the CoE's role in this field at the European level; 28 partly, the EAHY project built on earlier CoE discussions, starting with an Assembly Recommendation of 1963 on the preservation and development of ancient buildings and other sites. 29 In concrete terms, the 1970 Assembly initiative was underlain by a CCC report which for its part built on a 1969 conference in Brussels, co-organized by the CoE, the European Conference of Local Authorities, and Europa Nostra, an INGO active in this field. While UNESCO sent an observer to the 1969 meeting, the EC was not involved in these early stages of the initiative. 30 Together with smaller and more technical organizations, UNESCO and the CoE clearly took the lead in this emerging field of political action, and national administrations once again discussed the need for a 'useful division of labour between European and international parliamentary organizations' . 31 The CoE's EAHY initiative centred around raising awareness of architectural heritage across European societies and safeguarding existing buildings. Given its limited budget, a good part of the work focused on disseminating information: printed material, a multi-award winning film, and commemorative stamps and coins celebrating Europe's architecture and the EAHY fall into this category. National committees also organized pilot projects to restore and renovate historic monuments. A conference in Zurich in 1973 launched the preparatory campaign, followed up by a congress in Amsterdam in October 1975, at which the CoE adopted the European Charter of the Architectural Heritage. 32 During the formative stages of the project, the European Community played no noteworthy role in this endeavour. 33 In spring 1974, however, when the CoE's activities had been well under way for three years, the conservative British MP Lady Elles officially authored a report for the EP's Committee on Cultural Affairs that suggested creating an inventory of Europe's artistic treasures and called for active support for the CoE's initiative. 34 While bearing her name, it was Robert Grégoire, a civil servant in the Commission, who actually penned the report -revealing the strong links between these two EC organs. 35 During the EP session in May 1974, in which the Elles report was discussed, Commission VicePresident Carlo Scarascia-Mugnozza took the floor to stress that: 'the Commission is in full agreement on the importance of the European Architectural Heritage Year. We shall do all in our power … to ensure that the Year is a success. ' After this endorsement, the EP adopted the Resolution supporting the EAHY. 36 Roughly half a year later, in December 1974, the Commission followed up with a Recommendation to step up efforts to preserve Europe's cultural heritage. It urged member-states to sign or ratify UNESCO's convention on the protection of world heritage and recommended to 'actively support the actions' of the EAHY. 37 Close cooperation between some members of the EP and the Commission was thus the starting point for EC action in the field.
Why did the EC finally join the bandwagon? First, the zeitgeist attributed increasing relevance to questions of cultural heritage, with criticism of the negative effects of economic growth on heritage and the environment. This compelled an aspiring organization such as the EC to position itself. Also in this phase, the EC opted to avoid a clear-cut definition of culture: the term could encompass the fine arts, a way of living, a dimension of the economy and other things. This very vagueness created space for political initiatives. In some cases, culture was also merely a strategic device to push for further integration. 38 Beyond these reasons specific to culture, the EC also had other motives to become more active in this field. The end of the Gaullist challenge to the EC, the first enlargement round, the youth protests associated with '1968' and the dramatic changes in the architecture of internationalism in the Western world in the early 1970s sparked a far-ranging debate about the role of the EC and its concept of culture. The 1972 Paris Summit declared that economic integration was not an end in itself and adopted a report (officially authored by Spinelli but in fact penned by the aforementioned Grégoire) on community action in the cultural field. 39 The following year, the Copenhagen Declaration on European identity stressed that integration was based on common values and the 'diversity of cultures within the framework of a common European civilisation' . 40 Likewise, EP debates on cultural heritage at the time hardly connected culture to economic or social issues, but mainly understood it in anthropological terms, seeking to facilitate a common identity and more solidarity amongst Europeans. A growing sense of institutional crisis and some first cracks in the permissive consensus that had carried integration thus far, along with the search for ways to inject new dynamism into the integration process, were key reasons why the EC became more active in the field, and why it imported the concept of cultural heritage from UNESCO, the CoE, and national contexts. 41 But there were also specific links that explain the EC's sudden support for the EAHY. Elles's report built on a motion submitted by her Italian colleague Augusto Premoli on behalf of the Liberal and Allies group in the EP. 42 National and party boundaries did not hinder such transfers, given that Elles was a British conservative and Premoli an Italian liberal, and they were further facilitated by Grégoire in the Commission. 43 While the latter remained in the background, it was not just Elles herself who acknowledged Premoli's role, but also for instance the Commission. In the decisive EP session in May 1974, ScarasciaMugnozza first congratulated Elles for her motion, but then went on to 'express my own and the Commission's gratitude to Senator Premoli whose motion for a resolution was the starting point for this debate' . 44 Premoli, however, had only joined the EP in October 1972. Previously, he had been a member of the CoE's Consultative Assembly and as such also in the CCC. What is more, in 1970 he had been the rapporteur recommending the EAHY in the Consultative Assembly. 45 From playing a key role in launching the debate in the CoE at the beginning of the decade, he came to play the same role in the EC some four years later. 46 A thick layer of transnational networking came on top, with a preeminent British politician in the driving seat: Duncan Sandys, the staunchly pro-European (ex) son-in-law of Winston Churchill, had been involved in CoE business ever since the late 1940s. Even before Premoli's motion of 1970, Sandys had become the spiritus rector of the EAHY. During the period in which the Heritage Year was prepared, he authored several reports and recommendations on the programme's details. 47 Moreover, Sandys was central not just as an Assembly member and the CoE's chairman of the EAHY's International Organising Committee. He also acted as president of Europa Nostra (founded in 1963; under Sandys's presidency since 1969), the civil-society organization that played a crucial role in executing the EAHY. Many of his reports and recommendations helped assure a central role for Europa Nostra in realizing the EAHY -for instance by preparing reports or acquiring CoE funding for an EAHY film project. 48 Looking back, one leading German CoE cultural politician recently argued that Sandys 'accomplished that great job of turning Europa Nostra into a heavyweight; an index fossil for our work at the Council of Europe' . 49 And Sandys wore even more hats. In 1957, he had founded the Civic Trust in Great Britain, which now became the key hub executing the EAHY initiatives in his own country. CoE Assembly member and chairman of the EAHY International Organising Committee, president of Europa Nostra and of the Civic Trust -it was impossible to pull more strings at the same time, and the central role of Sandys and Europa Nostra in setting up the EAHY was undisputed. 50 Not everybody liked this, of course. In December 1972, for instance, the British Treasury stressed that the Civic Trust's role in implementing a scheme partly funded by the government 'places us in a most embarrassing situation' . 51 Still, the Civic Trust came to play an important role in the EAHY's implementation.
British politicians were also key in forging the link to the EC. Elles, who took up the ball in the EP, and Sandys were direct colleagues as Conservative members of the House of Lords; both of them belonged to the strongly pro-European wing of the party in which Elles also headed the international office, working hard to strengthen the links to continental parties of similar political orientation. In a House of Lords debate in 1976, one year after the EAHY, Elles extended 'my congratulations and thanks to my noble Friend Lord Duncan-Sandys for the initiative he took in establishing 1975 as the European Architectural Heritage Year' . After returning her thanks, Sandys stressed that there was 'room for closer coordination between the activities in this sphere of the Community and the Council of Europe' . To that effect, he also spoke to Commission President Ortoli around the same time. 52 These details shed light on the precise forms of interaction. It was not 'the' CoE that forged new links with 'the' EC, or the EC that supported a CoE initiative. Sandys was a transnational policy entrepreneur with his own agenda. While he was part of a specifically British debate about the conservation of architectural heritage, 53 he also aptly used inter-and transnational forums for his own ends. The examples of Premoli, Elles, Scarascia-Mugnozza and Ortoli demonstrate that inter-organizational linking and learning had strong supporters in the Consultative Assembly, the EP and the European Commission but much less in the EC's Council of Ministers and the CoE's Committee of Ministers. EP and Commission actors embraced CoE policies partly for content-related reasons, partly to broach new territory and win additional competences. 54 For the CoE, money was an important argument: in 1973, CCC chairman Georg KahnAckermann deplored the 'lack of resources' and the CCC's limited competences that kept it from playing a bigger role in the EAHY preparations. 55 While some, like Premoli, therefore strove to close ranks with the EC, others stressed the CoE's primacy in the field of culture. 56 In a letter to Sandys, CoE Secretary General Lujo Toncic-Sorinj for instance discussed the organization's financial problems, both with regard to the EAHY as well as more generally. He then went on to plead for a clear division of labour with the EC, rather than cooperation. 57 Sandys, in contrast, felt that the CoE lacked the resources to deliver properly. In an exchange with the same Kahn-Ackermann, he insisted: 'It is not enough to proclaim a Year, to set up a committee and to expect things to happen automatically. Money is required for this as for other activities. ' 58 This is exactly what the EC provided in the end: on the basis of its 1974 Resolution and Recommendation on the EAHY, the Community helped to finance the so-called European Centre in Venice, set up as a CoE initiative to oversee training of craftsmen in the conservation of architectural heritage. 59 All the same, the EC did not have a consistent, unambiguous position either. The Council of Ministers for instance stressed in late 1973 that with regard to the CoE, 'co-operation except for exchange of information was very difficult' . 60 While some national governments, such as the Irish, wanted more joint projects, others -including the British and German -remained critical, fearing unproductive overlap between the two organizations. 61 And while the Council's Tindemans report of 1975 gave legitimacy to such work by arguing that the Community 'must make itself felt in education and culture' , not all member-states were prepared to go that way. 62 The case of the EAHY also reveals that CoE actors and Sandys in particular had a clear vision of how cultural initiatives could impact East-West relations. They stressed from the beginning that the EAHY scheme was open to societies beyond the club of European democracies -as the CoE liked to describe itself. 63 Its seemingly apolitical and non-ideological character -CoE civil servant and public intellectual Nicolaus Sombart even spoke of its 'para-political' qualities -also made it acceptable for non-democratic European states. 64 In 1976, Sandys stressed that eventually 'Portugal, Spain, Yugoslavia, Poland, Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union' had also started to cooperate in the EAHY. Cultural heritage was seen as a pan-European phenomenon, serving as a bridge between West and East, but also to the (former) dictatorships in Europe's South. 65 Since EC actors simply followed the programmatic lead of the CoE and Europa Nostra, they did not add any specific angle to this. 66 Moreover, the EC was seen as the more politicized body in Western Europe. It was therefore easier for the CoE -supported and complemented by UNESCO in this endeavour -to forge a pan-European image and stress its role as a bridge-builder between East and West. 67 The EAHY initiative reveals several crucial aspects: the central role that a few individual transnational actors played as policy entrepreneurs and in linking various forums; the leading role of the CoE; and the fact that the EC only stepped in at a late stage, primarily by emulating CoE action and ultimately also with financial support. The asymmetry of resources between the CoE and the EC became an important source for a shift of role between the two organizations. For the time being, the EC's inroads into the field remained very limited, while for the CoE in general, the 1970s was a difficult period. It did not manage to deepen or widen its field of activities in substantial ways, which would have helped to tackle the challenge of the EC during the 1980s. 
Audio-visual policy: CoE and EC between emulation, cooperation and competition
Despite the opposition of certain member-states, the EC continued to expand its work in the field of culture during the second half of the 1970s. The 1974 EP Resolution on European heritage, supported by another Resolution on a 'Community Action in the Cultural Sector' in March 1976, offered a legal basis from which the Commission developed its activities further. In 1977, it issued a 'Communication on the Community Action in the Cultural Sector' , drafted by Grégoire. 69 This text remained cautious, approaching cultural policies primarily from the vantage point of market liberalization. However, its second part called for further action to protect architectural heritage, as a follow-up to the 1974 Resolution, and new measures like the creation of a European Youth Orchestra. The accession of Greece to the EC in 1981, and of Spain and Portugal in 1986, also gave impetus for more cultural integration. In the 1980s, describing Greece as the cradle of democracy and the EP as an heir of the Athenian parliament was a leitmotiv whenever members of the EP called for an enhanced cultural policy. 70 In the Cold War context, safeguarding Greek cultural heritage sent two messages: it presented the EC as the defender of European democratic values and highlighted North-South integration within Western Europe. While the EC continued to stress that it did not pursue cultural policy in the strict sense of the term, it thus broadened its activities in the field. 71 Actors in the CoE quickly felt that they were losing ground. When in 1982 a report of the Commission entitled a 'Stronger Community Action in the Cultural Sector' 72 proposed increasing the budget and developing long-term measures in the cultural sector, CoE representatives sensed that the EC was challenging their organization's primacy. A Recommendation by the CoE's Parliamentary Assembly of the time referred to 'the new initiatives for extending European Community activity in the general field of culture and education' , 'regretting that' EC texts 'only specifically refer to cultural co-operation at the level of this Community' . 73 The inter-organizational relationship would soon change forever. During the 1980s, competition between the CoE and the EC in the field of culture culminated in the field of audio-visual policy. As on so many other issues, the CoE was first to develop European policies in the field, originally with a focus on television and cinema, and it eventually turned into a laboratory for the EC. The two organizations pursued competing projects for the regulation of transnational broadcasting during the 1980s, and member-states used the CoE to counter EC initiatives they considered intrusive. In this field, interactions between the two organizations oscillated among cooperation, emulation and competition. To a large extent, these quickly evolving and complex interactions with the CoE account for the incremental constitution of a powerful EC cultural policy by the end of the decade.
As in the case of heritage, the CoE had started to address audio-visual issues during the 1950s, long before the EC, which became a significant actor only in the mid-1980s. 74 In the early 1960s, the CoE proposed to intensify 'the practical film co-operation which had been going on for some years' and 'develop its television work' . 75 In the following years, it consolidated its activities in the field. In 1976, for instance, it created an administrative unit on mass media and increased the means of its expert committee on cinema and television. 76 The CoE also organized numerous international conferences dedicated to audio-visual issues. 77 Through these initiatives, it built up the expertise that during the 1980s would turn out to be pivotal for the design of regulatory measures both in the CoE and EC.
The intensification of the CoE's activities, and the expansion of the field in general, were largely a consequence of technological change, with the development of communication satellites facilitating transfrontier broadcasting. Broadcasting now became a transnational issue and a field of harsh competition within Europe and with the United States and Japan. In 1981, the CoE's newly created permanent Steering Committee on Mass Media (SCMM) produced exploratory studies, especially on transfrontier television. In 1981, building on such work, the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE proposed a convention on transfrontier television in order to close Europe's regulatory gap in this domain. Since satellites allowed for transnational circulation and acquisition of audio-visual programmes, the goal was to secure, through legal cooperation, the artistic independence of programme-makers vis-à-vis the state and commercial interests (especially those of advertisers), the harmonization of copyright and royalty regulations, and respect for common standards regarding programme contents. 78 The first text adopted by the EP on audio-visual issues was to a large extent a reaction to these CoE initiatives. In 1982, an EP report (mainly dedicated to transfrontier broadcasting) started with the observation that, so far, only the CoE had been active in the field. 79 The EP stressed its intention not to leave the regulation of pan-European broadcasting to the CoE and raised the question of its own role in the field. The EP's answer to this question was twofold. For one, it recognized the validity of the CoE's project of a convention and urged the Commission to 'take account of the proposals currently being prepared by the CoE' . 80 The Commission followed this Recommendation; its first report on audio-visual issues largely built on the CoE's exploratory work and frequently referred to its texts. 81 For another, the EP emphasized the superiority of Community law because of its more binding quality -while a CoE convention would be legally enforceable its implementation would depend on each member-state's decision to ratify the text; EC legislation was directly binding throughout the Community. This superiority of the EC was stressed again in a second EP report in 1985. 82 The text argued that the Community 'must take considerably more far-reaching action than the CoE' in the audio-visual field and that 'any framework of law in this area should be produced by the European Community rather than leaving it to the less certain procedures of the Council of Europe' . 83 The EP criticized not only the regulatory weakness of the CoE but also its attempts to limit the EC's action in the audio-visual sector. The 1985 report denounced attempts by the CoE's SCMM to 'discuss initiatives called for by the European Parliament and taken by the Commission in bodies that have no authority to do so and actually to deliver opinions on such matters to Community bodies in order to hamper their activities and lead them in other directions' . From a latecomer in the audiovisual sector, emulating the CoE, the EC quickly turned into a self-confident competitor.
The CoE tried to fight this challenge by strengthening its cooperation with the EC, true to the motto 'if you can't beat them, join them. ' In October 1984, the new Secretary General of the CoE, Marcelino Oreja, recognized that the extension of the EC's competences constituted a major challenge for the CoE and worked hard to improve relations between the two organizations:
Admittedly, the coexistence in Europe of two institutional systems with a common purpose poses problems. But it would be pointless to take refuge in a chilly attitude of withdrawal: on the contrary, we must face up to the dynamism of the Community by adopting a positive attitude and devising new forms of co-operation. 84 A few days after his nomination, Oreja met with the Secretary General of the Commission, Émile Noël, who tried to cool down his enthusiasm: 'While accepting that this cooperation could be improved, I cautioned the Secretary General to be over-ambitious. I did not think that it was possible to achieve a "qualitative jump" regarding the cooperation between the two organisations or the participation in the conventions of the Council of Europe. ' 85 There was obviously a discrepancy between the CoE's and the EC's expectations. While the CoE, increasingly losing ground, searched for more cooperation, the EC's Commission, aware of its power, consciously set limits to this cooperation. In 1985, at the request of the CoE, both institutions appointed high-level contact groups 'to explore the feasibility of making further progress in co-operation' . Despite these efforts, a report by the CoE Secretary General observed that in the audio-visual field the two organizations' activities 'suffer from a lack of genuine co-ordination and complementarity' , the result being 'parallel action on the same issue, sometimes leading to divergent solutions' . 86 The EC's cultural activities gained remarkable momentum in the early 1980s and account for this discrepancy in the two organizations' attitudes. While in the mid-1970s, the EC needed to join the EAHY as a CoE activity to expand its remit, the EC's initiatives in culture now had a more independent institutional basis and legitimacy. The 1983 Solemn Declaration on European Union included a long list of actions to strengthen 'cultural cooperation' . 87 The EC's national ministers of culture started to meet regularly and, months after the Stuttgart declaration, decided to launch the European Capital of Culture programme. 88 During this period, heritage protection turned into a field of EC action and in 1984, the EP exercised its power to amend the budget and create a dedicated budget line. 89 The following year, the new Commission headed by Jacques Delors put culture high on its agenda. 90 There was now a separate Directorate-General, with an energetic Commissioner, Carlo Ripa di Meana, at the helm. 91 Finally, at a more general level, the publication of the 1985 White Paper on the completion of the Single Market by 1992 and the agreement reached with the Single European Act the following year gave market integration a lot of momentum. The objective of a common market for broadcasting was amongst the measures proposed in the White Paper. 92 In sum, by the mid-1980s, the EC had gained significant political, financial and administrative resources to develop its cultural policy. No longer did it need to cooperate with the CoE to justify its initiatives. Competition, hence, outpaced cooperation.
This rivalry was reinforced when the Commission proposed the ambitious 'Television without Frontiers' (TWF) Directive in April 1986, far superseding a first Green Paper from 1984, which had aimed mainly at deregulation, proposing an interventionist and protectionist instrument: a system of quotas for European audio-visual works. 93 Under this, 30% of the programming time of each broadcaster had to be reserved for audio-visual content produced in the EC, mainly to contain the growth of US productions. The EP and several member-states supported the Commission's plan, chiefly France and Italy as the major film producers in Europe. They had powerful allies within the Commission: the Italian Commissioner Ripa di Meana and above all President Delors, who actively supported the Directive during the final vote in the Commission. 94 Other countries blocked the Directive. Its idea was to regulate media content in order to achieve cultural objectives, which went beyond the creation of a common market. The United Kingdom, Germany and Denmark refused the very idea of EC competence in culture, including broadcasting. Several small member-states joined this coalition, especially Ireland, Portugal, Belgium and the Netherlands. These countries had weak film industries and imported most of their programmes. European productions were significantly more expensive than American ones: European quotas would have dramatically increased their expenditures. 95 Finally, countries that were not members of the EC but members of the CoE, like Austria, Sweden and Switzerland, considered a Community-centred solution inappropriate for a wider European problem. 96 In response to the Commission's proposed Directive, the Austrian government suggested organizing the first CoE European Ministerial Conference on mass-media policy in Vienna by the end of 1986 in order to make progress towards a CoE Convention. 97 The opponents of a Directive within the EC actively supported Austria's initiative and a CoE solution to the problem. In the ad hoc Working Party established by the European Council, they brought forward three main reasons for their choice. Firstly, if the cultural dimension of broadcasting was to be taken into consideration, this had to be done in the framework of an international organization officially in charge of culture, that is, the CoE. 98 Secondly, a CoE Convention, unlike an EC Directive, was based on unanimity and less binding. In that sense, it left the member-states more room for manoeuver. In the case of an EC Directive, in contrast, member-states could be sued for non-compliance. A third reason came on top for Germany: a CoE-framed solution had the advantage of including the German-speaking neighbours Switzerland and Austria that were not part of the EC. 99 While the Commission was therefore struggling to get its Directive adopted, the CoE Convention project made quick progress. At the Vienna conference in December 1986, the Ministers declared that the CoE, notably because of its geographical scope, was 'the most suitable institution for shaping a coherent mass media policy and for implementing such a policy' . 100 The Ministers agreed to create 'political instruments' and 'binding legal instruments' on transfrontier broadcasting, thus reacting to the EP's recurrent criticisms concerning the inefficiency of the CoE's regulations.
In the EC, the picture was very different. In 1987 and 1988, the divided European Council was unable to reach any agreement on the planned TWF Directive. Commission representatives started to fear that some countries wanted to abandon the project, considering it redundant in light of the CoE's initiative. In the EC negotiations, the Commission repeated its demand to give priority to its Directive and to assure the complementarity with the CoE's policy. 101 The Commission even tried to sabotage a meeting of the CoE's Ministers planned for April 1988 in Vienna to discuss the Convention project. It asked the EC member-states not to participate and unofficially urged the Austrian government to cancel the meeting, causing a stir amongst the representatives of the member-states in Brussels. 102 In July 1988, Ivo Schwartz, the Commission official who had drafted the Green Paper on the TWF, explained the situation to the German CDU federal committee for media policy: 'Let's not forget that the idea of the Convention came from the opponents of the creation of a common broadcasting market and is above all a manoeuvre to prevent or at least to delay the Directive. ' 103 Transborder television thus became the field of a downright 'regulatory race' between the two organizations. 104 However, the two competing projects also started to converge during 1988, not least due to the contacts between experts active in both organizations. These contacts were particularly useful to change the French government's position, initially in favour of an ambitious EC Directive and opposed to a less protectionist CoE Convention. At the time, Michel Lummaux was Vice-President of the CoE's SCMM and Bernard Blin was the official in charge of the negotiations on the CoE Convention in the French Foreign Ministry. 105 Lummaux and Blin regularly informed their colleague Michel Berthod, member of the EC ad hoc experts committee on the TWF Directive, about the progress made within the CoE. 106 They argued that adoption of the CoE's project, while not entirely satisfactory for France, would be a good next step: 'It will not be possible to hold a maximalist position in Brussels for long. It could therefore be in our interest to reach first an agreement on minimal European regulation within the CoE, which would not exclude further progress at the Community level at a later stage. ' 107 Blin and his German counterpart discussed combining the two projects in the CoE's SCMM. Blin reported to his ministry that an agreement on the CoE Convention was probably the only way to lift the German veto on the EC Directive. 108 These discussions between experts eventually impacted on the negotiations on the member-states' representatives at the EC level, much to the regret of the European Commission. In September 1988, Delors wrote to the President of the Luxembourg Government, Jacques Santer: 'We observed that several member states try to replace certain aspects of the Commission's proposal by solutions established by experts meeting within the Council of Europe. ' 109 This manoeuvre was largely successful: in the end, the EC's European Council adapted its Directive largely along the lines of the CoE Convention on Transfrontier Television, which had been finalized in November 1988. It thus aimed at avoiding a chaotic situation in which the member-states of the CoE and the EC would have to comply with diverging regulations. 110 In December 1988, the European Council declared that it was 'important that the Community's efforts should be deployed in a manner consistent with the Council of Europe Convention' and asked the Commission to 'adapt the proposal [for the TWF Directive] in the light of the Council of Europe Convention' . 111 However, the stipulations of the Convention were less interventionist than the EC Directive. In contrast to the proposed EC Directive, the CoE Convention did not speak of quotas and instead recommended a vague 'majority proportion' of European works. Similarly, the text was more lenient on advertizing. 112 As the representative of the EP Culture Committee underlined, following the Convention on these points would be a way of watering down the most interventionist and protectionist elements of the Directive. 113 Despite the EP's attempts to reintroduce quotas, this 'soft' version of the Directive was eventually adopted on 3 October 1989. 114 The CoE's Convention had a further characteristic that was absent from the EC Directive: it could be opened to non-member countries, including the countries of the Eastern Bloc. The CoE in 1988 organized a symposium dedicated to cinema and television as a vector of exchange between East and West that brought together professionals and experts from both sides of the Iron Curtain. 115 In the following years, the CoE time and again recommended that European audio-visual policy should put special emphasis on East-West relations, both for CoE and EC programmes. 116 As during the 1970s, the CoE continued to see itself and culture as bridge-builders between East and West.
In the end, both organizations thus created regulatory frameworks. The fact that the EC Directive emulated the less binding instruments designed in the CoE could at first sight appear as a setback for the promoters of the supremacy of EC law. In the long run, however, adapting the CoE policy line proved beneficial for the EC. As predicted by the French officials mentioned above, the integration of the CoE's more consensual stipulations eventually allowed the supporters of an EC solution to 'save' the Directive and lay the foundation of an EC audio-visual policy. As the French Minister for European Affairs, Edith Cresson, declared after the European Council negotiations of April 1989: 'The compromise that we have reached is probably too timid. It represents however the starting point of a dynamic movement which will help us to save our culture and our film production. ' 117 Immediately thereafter, the Commission started to formulate proposals for the development of what was now called a 'European audio-visual policy' . 118 The Treaty of Maastricht (art. 128) substantially enhanced the EC's cultural competences. On its basis, the Commission created a 'European audio-visual policy' unit, which played an active role in the GATT negotiations of 1993. 119 The official in charge of this unit considered that the 1989 TWF Directive constituted the 'legislative foundation for audio-visual regulation, which as acquis communautaire will contribute to strengthen the Europeans' position in the negotiations of the Uruguay Round' . 120 As a matter of fact, by the 1990s, the EC had become the main policy arena for discussing the European positions in the audio-visual sector both at the inner-European and global levels. 121 The CoE, in contrast, had become marginal.
Conclusion
Our analysis demonstrates the need to examine inter-organizational connections in order to explain the logics and dynamics underlying the emergence of an EC cultural policy, even if the bulk of the existing literature has ignored this factor. Its significance, shown here for one specific policy domain, has wide implications for the history of European integration more generally, as the introduction to this special issue demonstrates in more detail. 122 On questions of cultural heritage as well as audio-visual policies, the CoE took the lead, while the EC only stepped in at a later stage. The CoE functioned as a laboratory of ideas but also a springboard for EC initiatives. Given the CoE's pioneering role, the EC, in turn, had to justify its policies, and there were three main reasons why it eventually successfully challenged the CoE's superiority: its superior financial means; its legally more binding regulations; and the links between cultural policy and the market-integration project, to which the CoE had no equivalent. Moreover, our analysis underlines the importance of going beyond a sheer focus on the two organizations -both of them have to be disaggregated further, but also placed into broader contexts. For the EC, for instance, the European Parliament and the Commission played important roles -hence, it is key to scrutinize the role of specific organs within an organization. Moreover, it is crucial to also transcend the scope of the CoE and the EC and examine transnational policy entrepreneurs and their networks as well as INGOs, all of which operated across several organizations and contexts. People such as Sandys, Premoli and Grégoire played an important role in connecting the various professional, institutional and political levels, and the same holds true for pressure groups such as Europa Nostra and other networks. Despite the increasing competition between the two organizations, sometimes instrumentalized by member-states opposed to an ambitious European cultural policy, individual transnational actors and INGOs represented channels for the circulation of policy ideas, especially from the CoE to the EC.
The actors who contributed to the emergence of the EC cultural policy were therefore very diverse in terms of professional and institutional positions, and shared no specific political affiliation. The geography of exchanges also varied according to the specific question at stake. In the case of heritage, the British and Italians played a particularly prominent role, while amongst the big EC and CoE member-states, the absence of France is striking. 123 On audio-visual policy, in contrast, French actors proved particularly active.
Finally, while remaining a small policy field for the EC at the time, culture was highly contentious. For this reason, it has remained an ancillary policy in the EU to this day, while the CoE's activities have not gained much more momentum either. In the (late) Cold War context, cultural policy was deployed to challenge the East-West divide. In this case, the initiative lay mainly with the less politicized CoE. The Cold War first had to end -and the EC incrementally develop a cultural policy strongly inspired by the CoE -before the EC/ EU managed to develop cultural-policy initiatives that truly served as bridge-builders to countries of the former East.
Notes

